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Aql va ehtıroslar zıddıyatı: D. Yum falsafasida shaxsning axloqiy qiyofasi

This article explores the problem of personality through the prism of David Hume’s moral philosophy and his views on human nature. Unlike traditional rationalist approaches associated with Descartes and Spinoza, D. Hume describes the human “I” not as a logical center but as a set of affects (passions) and habits. The article analyzes Hume’s famous thesis, “Reason is a slave to the passions,” and reveals the voluntaristic (volitional-emotional), rather than cognitive, foundations of personal identity. The results of the study show that the stability of the individual is manifested not in memory but in “character”—that is, in the mechanisms of stabilized passions and social sympathy.

Сведения

Опубликовано
2026 · Т. 7, № 3, С. 434-438
Язык
Узбекский
ISSN
2181-1415
Издатель
inScience LLC